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Abstract
We present an approach to incentivising monitoring for norm
violations in open multi-agent systems such as Wikipedia. In
such systems, there is no crisp definition of a norm viola-
tion; rather, it is a matter of judgement whether an agent’s
behaviour conforms to generally accepted standards of be-
haviour. Agents may legitimately disagree about borderline
cases. Using ideas from scrip systems and peer prediction,
we show how to design a mechanism that incentivises agents
to monitor each other’s behaviour for norm violations. The
mechanism keeps the probability of undetected violations
(submissions that the majority of the community would con-
sider not conforming to standards) low, and is robust against
collusion by the monitoring agents.
Introduction
Consider a setting in which agents contribute to and collec-
tively maintain a shared resource. Such settings arise fre-
quently. Examples include a collectively authored encyclo-
pedia (such as Wikipedia), a community-authored street map
(such as OpenStreetMap), an open source software project,
and a discussion forum in which people comment on news
stories. Agents can make changes to the resource, for exam-
ple, by writing a new article in the encyclopedia or by mak-
ing a series of edits to an existing article. We assume that
there are generally accepted community standards govern-
ing what constitutes acceptable behaviour. These standards
may, for example, regulate the content of articles that can
be posted or require that articles must be balanced.1 The
community in general benefits if the standards are upheld.
However, the actions of some agents may occasionally vi-
olate the community standards. Such violations may be in-
advertent (the agent does not realise his behaviour is non-
compliant) or malicious (the agent knows his behaviour is
non-compliant).
∗Supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0534064, IIS-0812045,
IIS-0911036, and CCF-1214844, and by AFOSR grants FA9550-
08-1-0438, FA9550-09-1-0266, and FA9550-12-1-0040, and ARO
grant W911NF-09-1-0281.
Copyright c© 2017, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1Examples of standards applying to Wikimedia projects
can be found at meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_
principles.
In this paper, we focus on the question of how to en-
sure the community standards are applied and offending be-
haviour is detected. We do not consider enforcement here,
that is, what should be done about someone who violates
the community standards; our focus is only on detection of
a violation. A key problem is that the community standards
that govern the behaviour of agents are typically not hard
and fast rules—they require interpretation in each particu-
lar case to determine whether a violation has occurred. We
assume that the standards are broadly accepted, but agents
may legitimately disagree about borderline cases.
The problem of incentivising agents to provide accurate
answers in settings where there is no ground truth has been
extensively studied in the literature on peer prediction (see,
e.g., (Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser 2005)). The key idea
is that, while there is no certain way to tell whether an agent
has answered correctly, agents doing their best to make a
determination will tend to agree with each other much of
the time, so we can use agreements with other agents as a
measure of how good a job an agent is doing. Recently, these
techniques have seen use in crowdsourcing settings as a way
to reward people for quality work and deter behaviours such
as spamming (Kamar and Horvitz 2012).
Prior work on peer prediction has studied settings where
agents are incentivised with money; these techniques are not
immediately applicable to settings where monetary incen-
tives cannot be used (as is typically the case for collectively
maintained resources). Alechina et al. (2016) showed how
incentives can be supplied for detecting violated norms with-
out the use of money in settings where (1) if a violation is
detected, there is an easily-checkable incontestable ‘witness’
to the violation, that is, an easy way to convince others that
there was indeed a violation (e.g., an inappropriate piece of
text) and (2) that the violation would be found if an agent
checked (even though checking might take time). In this pa-
per, we show how the approach of Alechina et al. can be
extended to allow us to use peer prediction without reliance
on money. While, for concreteness, we focus on the spe-
cific problem of determining whether a norm has been vi-
olated, our techniques are equally applicable to other tasks
for which agents have no access to ground truth, a common
occurrence in crowdsourcing settings (e.g. labelling data).
In (Alechina et al. 2016), agents are incentivised to moni-
tor by payments in scrip, which the agents use in turn to pay
for their own submissions in the future (which are monitored
for norm violations). Each norm violation was assumed to
have an easily checkable witness and was guaranteed to be
found by a motivated checker, it sufficed to have a single mo-
tivated agent check for a violation. However, we consider
standards that are a matter of interpretation, so we cannot
simply choose an agent to check for a violation. A checking
agent may, for example, have an incentive to falsely claim
that that behaviour violates the community standards if she
disagrees with the material or wishes to suppress a particular
point of view. Similarly, a checking agent may prefer not to
report what she suspects most people would view as a viola-
tion. We do assume that the community standards are suffi-
ciently widespread that most people will agree on what con-
stitutes a violation and that subject expertise is not needed to
detect a violation. Moreover, we allow for the possibility that
there is a small sub-community with different standards or
that may deliberately want to violate the norm (for example,
by defacing a Wikipedia page).
Thus, rather than choosing a single agent to monitor a
contribution, we choose (at random) a small committee to
do the monitoring. Roughly speaking, we take there to be a
violation if a majority of the committee believes that there
is a violation. Of course, we must set up the incentives
so that agents cannot gain by collusion. Once we consider
such committees, there are further problems. If we reward
a committee for detecting a violation (i.e., if a majority of
the committee says that there is a violation), it seems that
an agent has an incentive to always declare there to be a
violation. With some probability, her declaring a violation
might result in a violation being declared where otherwise
that would not have been the case, so she gets rewarded.
We deal with this by punishing agents slightly for declar-
ing a violation when other agents do not. As in (Alechina et
al. 2016), the ‘punishments’ and ‘rewards’ are in terms of
scrip. The connection between scrip and utility is somewhat
indirect: scrip is needed to post a submission, which is what
gives utility. Although what we have is essentially a scor-
ing rule, of which many are known in the literature (Gneit-
ing and Raftery 2007), the fact that we are dealing with both
scrip and utility introduces subtleties. In any case, setting the
penalties appropriately suffices to give a Nash equilibrium.
Preliminaries
As in (Alechina et al. 2016), we consider two settings. In
the first setting, while agents may submit content that most
community members would judge as not conforming to the
community standards, they do so unintentionally, intuitively,
because they viewed it as acceptable even though most com-
munity members would not. We shall refer to such submis-
sions as ‘bad’ although we stress that we do not presuppose
the existence of ground truth. Suppose that, in the case of
unintentional violations, the probability of unintentionally
submitting bad content is b. In the second setting, we assume
that whether to make a bad submission is a strategic decision
(e.g., someone may want to vandalize a Wikipedia page). In
this second scenario, we will also be particularly interested
in coalitions, since it may well be the case that there is a
sub-community that desires to vandalize a page. (Dealing
with coalitions is also important in the unintentional case.)
Roughly speaking, in the setting of Alechina et al. (2016),
where an agent who found a violation could provide unim-
peachable evidence of the violation, the idea was that a ran-
dom monitor was chosen for each post. If the monitor de-
tected a violation, then he was paid (in scrip). The payment
was sufficient that, given the probability of violations, the
expected amount of scrip received for monitoring was suffi-
cient compensation for the loss of utility due to monitoring
(because the scrip was needed to allow further posts, which
increased utility). Thus, agents were incentivised to volun-
teer to be monitors.
We cannot just adopt the same approach here, since the
two assumptions made by Alechina et al. do not hold: there
is no ‘witness’ to a violation nor is a motivated monitor guar-
anteed to find a violation (since there may not be agreement
on whether a violation even occurred). For modelling pur-
poses, we assume that there are two types of submissions,
which we call good or bad. A community member may view
a good submission as unacceptable (this is a false negative),
but this is unlikely; similarly, a community member may
view a bad submission as acceptable (this is a false positive),
but this is also unlikely. We assume for simplicity that there
is a probability µ for both false positives and false negatives.
Unintentional Setting
Adapting the model of Alechina et al. (2016), the game in
the unintentional violations case is described by the follow-
ing parameters:
• a finite set of n agents 1, . . . , n;
• the time between rounds is 1/n;2
• at each round t an agent is picked at random to submit (we
implicitly assume that agents always have something that
they want to submit);
• utility of submission (to agent doing the submitting): 1;
• (dis)utility of monitoring (to agent doing the monitor-
ing, provided the agent actually does the checking): −α
(where 0 < α < 1);
• probability of a bad submission: b;
• probability of a false positive or a false negative: µ;
• maximum acceptable probability of the system making an
error: µ′;
• discount rate: δ ∈ (0, 1).
The game runs forever. As is standard in the literature, we
assume that agents discount future payoffs. This captures the
intuition that a util now is worth more than a util tomorrow,
and allows us to compute the total utility derived by an agent
in the infinite game. We have assumed for simplicity that the
system is homogeneous: all agents get the same utility for
submitting (1), the same disutility for monitoring (−α), have
the same probability of being chosen to submit something
2The assumption that the time between rounds is 1/n, origi-
nally due to Friedman et al. (2006), makes the analysis easier. It
guarantees that, on average, each agent wants to make one submis-
sion per time unit, independent of the total number of agents.
(1/n), and have the same discount factor (δ). Using ideas
from (Kash, Friedman, and Halpern 2012), we can extend
the approach discussed here to deal with different types of
agents, characterised by different parameters. Some agents
may want to submit more often; other agents may be less
patient (so have a smaller discount rate); and so on.
We need additional notation to describe what happens:
• pt ∈ {1, . . . , n} is the agent chosen to submit in round t;
• V t ⊆ {1, . . . , n} \ {pt} is the set of agents chosen to
monitor in round t;
• vti : the vote of agent i if i ∈ V t; vti = 1 if the monitor
‘votes’ for a violation, and 0 otherwise.
The utility of an agent i in round t is:
uti =
 1 if i = p
t and i’s submission is posted;
−α if i ∈ V t and monitors honestly;
0 otherwise.
Given the discount factor δ, the total utility Ui for agent i is
Σ∞t=0δ
t/n uti.
Mechanism for the Unintentional Setting
We would like to incentivise the agents to do the monitor-
ing themselves, but we cannot pay them in utility because
there is no source of additional utility in the system. In par-
ticular, we cannot levy fines for violations and pay monitors
in fines because the system is open; instead of paying fines,
agents can just leave and re-join under different identity. We
address this problem using techniques from scrip systems
(Friedman, Halpern, and Kash 2006). We can think of scrip
as ‘virtual money’ or ‘tokens’. Performing an action costs to-
kens and monitoring is rewarded with tokens. The main dif-
ference between our setting and that of (Friedman, Halpern,
and Kash 2006) is that instead of always transferring a to-
ken from the agent who needs the work done to the agent
who does the work, in the monitoring setting the agents who
do the work (monitors) are not always rewarded. This re-
quires a non-trivial adaptation of the techniques developed
in (Friedman, Halpern, and Kash 2006).
A fundamental difference from (Alechina et al. 2016) and
the contexts in which prior scrip systems have been applied
is that since monitors do not produce a witness (because they
cannot), there is no way to check whether the work which is
being rewarded by scrip tokens has actually been done. Nor
can a monitor’s verdict be checked in an objective way. To
address this problem, we use techniques from peer predic-
tion (Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser 2005), which has been
used for incentivising agents to honestly rate products.
At a high level, the idea of the mechanism is that ev-
ery time an agent submits a request, a set of m agents is
chosen to monitor, where m is even. If more than m/2
volunteers say that the submission is acceptable, it is ac-
cepted; otherwise it is rejected. The size m of this set is
chosen to make the probability that the majority vote of
the set leading to a false positive or false negative, namely,∑m
j=m/2+1 C(m, j)µ
j(1 − µ)m−j , where C(m, j) is m
choose j, at most µ′ (the desired bound on the system mak-
ing an error). Payments to agents are calculated using a peer
prediction rule to ensure that they maximise their expected
number of tokens by truthfully monitoring. We also make
sure that the volunteers actually monitor (rather than just
pretending to do so) by ensuring that volunteers who sim-
ply report an answer without monitoring receive a negative
token payment in expectation.
Our interpretation of how bad submissions occur with
probability b is that there is a true underlying probability
β that a submission is actually acceptable, but agents can-
not access this ground truth directly. However, after generat-
ing a tentative submission, they can check if it is acceptable.
They will post the submission only if it passes the check.
However, with probability µ, an unacceptable submission
will pass the check. Since the probability that a submission
is unacceptable and passes the check is just the probability
that it passes the check given that it is unacceptable multi-
plied by the probability that it is unacceptable, we have that
b = (1− β)µ.
As the idea of using peer prediction for norm monitor-
ing where there is no witness for a norm violation is of
interest even without the rest of our machinery for incen-
tivising monitoring in the absence of money (or other meth-
ods of providing rewards and punishments), we state it as a
separate lemma. For reasons the proof of the lemma makes
clear, the specific payment rule that we use is that an agent
who says ‘acceptable’ and the committee agrees receives no
payment, an agent who says ‘acceptable’ and the commit-
tee disagrees must pay a token to the submitter, an agent
who says ‘unacceptable’ and the committee disagrees must
also pay a token to the submitter, and an agent who says
‘unacceptable’ and the committee agrees receives a pay-
ment of 1−bb − (1−b)
2µ′′
b2(1−µ′′)+b(1−b)µ′′ from the submitter, where
µ′′ =
∑m−1
j=m/2+1 C(m−1, j)µj(1−µ)m−1−j . (Recall that
b is the probability of a bad submission.) This is an example
of a scoring rule, as in the peer-prediction literature. Other
rules could also be used, as long as they have the required
properties (as outlined in Lemma 1).
Lemma 1: With the payments described, there is an equilib-
rium of the monitoring game where all agents who volunteer
to monitor will exert effort and report their true belief. Fur-
thermore, agents who deviate by not exerting effort receive
a negative payoff in expectation while those who follow the
equilibrium receive a positive payoff.
Proof: First, we show that agents who do not exert effort
and instead just select a report have a negative expected pay-
ment. If the agent just says ‘acceptable’, he gets a payoff
of 0 if the majority says ‘acceptable’, and a payoff of −1
if the majority says ‘unacceptable’, so clearly the agent is
worse off by saying ‘acceptable’ (without monitoring) than
not volunteering at all. A monitor who deviates by saying
‘unacceptable’ without monitoring receives a payoff of −1
with probability (1−b)(1−µ′′)+bµ′′ (since this is the prob-
ability that the majority of the m − 1 non-deviating moni-
tors say ‘acceptable’), and gets 1−bb − (1−b)
2µ′′
b2(1−µ′′)+b(1−b)µ′′
with probability b(1 − µ′′) + (1 − b)µ′′. Note that ( 1−bb −
(1−b)2µ′′
b2(1−µ′′)+b(1−b)µ′′ )(b(1−µ′′)+(1−b)µ′′) = (1−b)(1−µ′′)
(which is exactly why that particular payment was chosen),
so the deviator loses bµ′′ tokens in expectation with this de-
viation.
For agents who do actually monitor, it is easily verified
that the payments constitute a peer-prediction scheme with
correct incentives, so they maximize their expected payoff
by monitoring. All that remains is to verify that this expected
payment is non-negative, and a straightforward calculation
shows that it is approximately 1− b.
The lemma shows that correct behaviour is an equilib-
rium, but in peer-prediction settings, it is well known that
there are other equilibria. For example, all monitors always
reporting ‘acceptable’ is an equilibrium, as is all monitors
always reporting ‘unacceptable’ (in the latter case, no agent
will ever attempt to post anything). However, since the sys-
tem is largely composed of agents who wish the norm to be
enforced correctly, we expect that the ‘cooperative’ equilib-
rium, where all agents do in fact monitor correctly, to be the
one that arises in practice.
By setting appropriate parameters and assuming the sys-
tem has sufficiently many agents who are all sufficiently pa-
tient, the mechanism can ensure that the probability of unde-
tected violations is arbitrarily low (with a caveat) and hon-
est participation is arbitrarily close to an equilibrium. The
caveat is that m monitors are required and monitoring costs
each monitor α while the value of a submission is 1. So
if αm ≥ 1 participation is irrational. This imposes an up-
per bound on m. Say that µ′ is achievable if there exists
m ≤ 1/α such that∑mj=m/2+1 C(m, j)µj(1−µ)m−j ≤ µ′.
Theorem 1: For all achievable probabilities µ′ and all  >
0, there exist a δ sufficiently close to 1, a committee size m,
and an n sufficiently large such that if all n agents use a
discount factor δ′ ≥ δ, then there exists a k such that the
mechanism above with all agents volunteering to monitor iff
they have fewer than k tokens is an -Nash equilibrium and
the probability of undetected violations is at most µ′.
Proof: [Sketch] The basic structure of the analysis is the
same as that in (Alechina et al. 2016; Friedman, Halpern,
and Kash 2006), but the details are more complex. Intu-
itively, an agent does not want to run out of tokens, since
then he will not be able to make a submission. Thus, if he
starts running low on tokens, he will volunteer to be a mon-
itor. What is the appropriate threshold at which an agent
should volunteer to monitor? That depends in part on how
much competition he will have when volunteering, which in
turn depends on the other agents’ thresholds for volunteer-
ing. It can be shown that, if we fix a threshold strategy for
each agent, then the system quickly reaches a steady state
where we can completely characterize the distribution of to-
kens (i.e., what fraction of agents will have k′ tokens for
each value of k′). The analysis involves a consideration of
a Markov chain whose states are the number of tokens each
agent has. The analysis is a little more complex in our set-
ting than in earlier papers because more than one agent is
needed as a monitor. Such systems have been studied by
(Humbert, Manshaei, and Hubaux 2011); while they result
in a more complex steady-state distribution of wealth than
was the case in the earlier papers, the same basic analysis
goes through. The key result is that there is a distribution
d of tokens (i.e. the fraction of agents with each number of
tokens) such that, for n sufficiently large, the probability of
the distribution of tokens in the system being close to d is
close to 1.
The rest of the argument is the same as that of (Friedman,
Halpern, and Kash 2006). Clearly, if µ′ is achievable, then
we can choose a group size m so that the error rate is at
most µ′. It can be shown that if the system stayed exactly
at the steady-state distribution then the optimal strategy is a
threshold strategy. If n and δ are sufficiently large, the poten-
tial gains from deviating due to the distribution not staying
exactly at the steady state distribution is less than .
There are two problems with the mechanism above. The
first is that we need to explain what to do if an agent has 0
(or a negative number of) tokens. Clearly the agent cannot
make a submission, because he will not be able to pay the
monitors if they find a problem. But he also cannot monitor,
because he may not be able to pay the submitter if his eval-
uation of the submission does not agree with the majority.
We can deal with this problem by allowing agents to mon-
itor even if they have 0 or fewer tokens (although they still
cannot make a submission if they do not have enough tokens
to pay for it). Now it is possible that monitors will keep get-
ting more and more in debt (we will need to keep track of
how much is owed; we ignore how this is done here), but
this is extremely unlikely, since, in expectation, agents gain
tokens every time they monitor. Another concern is that an
agent who is sufficiently in debt will just drop out of the sys-
tem and re-enter with a new id. We expect that, in practice,
for agents who are only slightly in debt, the overhead of re-
registering with the system will not make it worth dropping
out. For agents who are significantly in debt, it may well
be worth dropping out, but this will happen with extremely
low probability. This means that the true expected cost of
a submission is a little larger than we have stated, because
it must take into account that a submitter will not be paid
(with extremely low probability) by an agent who owed him
money and then drops out of the system. This small change
in expectation does not affect the analysis. Friedman and
Resnick (2001) discuss this issue and possible mitigations
in further detail.
The second problem with this mechanism is that we need
m monitors at each step, and m may be large. We can do
much better by taking a two-step monitoring approach. We
briefly sketch the details here. Suppose, for example, that
µ = .1 and we want µ′ = .0005. Then, with the mechanism
above, we must take m = 10. With 10 monitors, we can en-
sure that the rate of false positives (a bad submission being
posted) and the rate of false negatives (a good submission
being rejected) is less than .0005. Suppose that we use a two-
step approach: we take a group of 5 monitors, and accept if
at least 4 of the 5 find it acceptable and reject if at least 4 of
the 5 find it unacceptable. If neither of these two events oc-
cur, then we use 5 more monitors, and accept if greater than
5 find it acceptable and reject otherwise (i.e., we go back to
our original scheme). The probability of a false positive and
false negative is still less than .0005. However, now the ex-
pected number of monitors needed is significantly less. It is
straightforward to check that, with probability greater than
.9, a submission will be accepted or rejected using just 5
monitors. Thus, the expected number of monitors needed is
< .9(5) + .1(10) = 5.5, which is significantly less than 10.
In general, if m∗ is the expected number of monitors needed
to achieve a false positive/negative rate of µ′, we must have
m∗ < 1/α for Theorem 1 to hold. The key point is that m∗
may be significantly less than the m that was needed for the
earlier mechanism.
We can get an even smaller expected number of moni-
tors by starting with a committee of 4 and then increasing
the committee one by one up to 10, stopping as soon the
decisions are such that the rate of false positives and false
negatives is guaranteed to be less than µ′. But, in practice,
there might be some overhead in having too many stages in
the committee process. While it is not uncommon to have a
two-step process, it is rare to go beyond that. For example,
while we might have a group of three reviewers for a paper,
and then call in additional reviewers if the three reviewers
cannot reach consensus, it is rare that we call in additional
reviewers one at a time for a potentially extended sequence
of steps.
Strategic Violations
We now turn to strategic violations. In this scenario, when
an agent is chosen to submit a post, he can choose whether
to submit something he believes to be good or something he
believes to be bad. (We implicitly assume that agents have
a collection of submissions that they believe good or bad
available for posting.) Of course, as in the unintentional set-
ting, the agent might be mistaken. Let γb be the probability
that an intended submission he believes to be bad is bad and
let γg be the probability that an intended submission he be-
lieves to be good actually is good. For simplicity, we take
γb = γg = γ, and assume that γ > 1/2. The other param-
eters are the same as in the previous section, except that b,
the probability that a submission is bad, is no longer deter-
mined exogenously, but is the result of the agent’s strategic
decision. Further, the utility of a bad posting is no longer
1, but κ > 1. (We must assume κ > 1 here, otherwise no
agent would ever post anything bad: the utility of doing so
is no higher than that of posting something good, and the
violation may be detected.)
We now show that essentially the same mechanism used
in the case of inadvertent bad postings can be used to control
what b will be in equilibrium, by choosing the committee
size appropriately; larger committees lead to smaller values
of b and vice versa. The idea is the following: we proceed as
in the previous section, using exactly the same mechanism
except that all occurrences of b in the payments are replaced
by 1−γ (1−γ plays essentially the same role in the analysis
as b), and choose a committee so that the probability that a
good submission is accepted is at least 1−µ′ and, similarly,
the probability that a bad submission is rejected is at least
1−µ′. Thus, an agent’s expected utility if he posts something
he believes to be good is at least γ(1 − µ′) + (1 − γ)µ′
(since γ > 1/2), while the agent’s expected utility if he posts
something that he believes to be bad is at most γµ′κ+ (1−
γ)κ(1−µ′) (here we are assuming that if the submission that
the agent believed to be bad is accepted by the committee (so
is likely to be good) and is posted, then the agent still gets
utility κ). So, as long as we can choose µ′ such that
γ(1− µ′) + (1− γ)µ′ > γµ′κ+ (1− γ)κ(1− µ′), (1)
then posting only submissions that the agent believes to be
good is better than posting a submission that the agent be-
lieves to be bad. Note that (1) will be easy to satisfy if
γ > (1 − γ)κ, which should be the case in practice (we
would expect γ to be close to 1).
Note also that, as far as expected number of tokens goes, it
is also better to post only submissions believed to be good.
Roughly speaking, if an agent posts something that he be-
lieves to be good, then in the typical case (where the com-
mittee views it as acceptable), he pays 0 to all the agents who
agree with the committee and receives 1 token from agents
who disagree. On the other hand, if an agent posts something
that he believes to be bad, then in the typical case (where
the committee views it as unacceptable), then he must pay
γ
1−γ − γ
2µ′
(1−γ)2(1−µ′)+γ(1−γ)µ′ to each monitor who agrees
with the decision. While a detailed calculation must take all
the other possibilities into account (e.g., that the post is good
but is viewed as unacceptable), the conclusion remains the
same: in terms of expected number of tokens, the agent is
better off submitting a post he believes to be good than sub-
mitting one he believes to be bad.
Thus, we get the following result in the strategic setting:
Theorem 2: For all achievable probabilities µ′ satisfying
(1) and all  > 0, there exist a δ sufficiently close to 1, a
committee size m, and an n sufficiently large such that if
all n agents use a discount factor δ′ ≥ δ, then there exists
a k such that the mechanism above with all agents using a
threshold of k is an -Nash equilibrium and the probability
of undetected violations is at most µ′.
The proof is omitted because it involves only minor
changes to the proof of Theorem 1.
It is interesting to compare this result with the correspond-
ing theorem of Alechina et al. (2016) in the strategic set-
ting. Because, in the setting of Alechina et al., a violation
would certainly be found if a bad submission was checked,
in equilibrium, the normative organization deliberately does
not monitor some small fraction of submissions. (Roughly
speaking, this is because, in the mechanism proposed by
Alechina et al., monitors get paid only if they find a viola-
tion. If all posts are monitored, then no bad submissions are
made, so monitors have no incentive to monitor.) Further-
more, their equilibrium result in agents intentionally mak-
ing bad submissions, while in our equilibrium all bad sub-
missions still arise inadvertently. On the other hand, in the
setting of Alechina et al., the normative organization can get
the probability of a bad post to be arbitrarily low. Here, the
probability of an undetected violation is at most µ′, but µ′
must be achievable and satisfy (1).
In the simplified model we used for the analysis in this
section, we assumed that all submissions are equally diffi-
cult to judge. In practice, some submissions may be obvi-
ously good or bad, while others may be borderline cases.
Moreover, malicious agents may have some knowledge of
how difficult a submission will be to judge, and exploit this
knowledge. Allowing for such additional knowledge would
not substantively change our model, but would make the
equations messier. For simplicity, we took the probability
of a false positive and false negative to be the same, but
the analysis would work equally well if they were differ-
ent. Borderline cases would result in an increased probabil-
ity of a false negative (and perhaps also decrease γ, since
such agents also seem more likely to accidentally choose a
non-violating submission). With these changes, essentially
the same analysis would go through.
Coalition Resilience
Our previous analysis used peer-prediction techniques to en-
sure correct incentives for monitors and acceptable error
rates. However, in a large open system there may be a small
group who work together to either achieve norm violations
or otherwise subvert the system (perhaps by simply reducing
the effort they need to exert earning tokens).
It follows from the equilibrium analysis sketched in the
proof of Theorem 1 that, in equilibrium, for any given sub-
mission, a significant fraction of the agents are willing to
volunteer to monitor, so the odds of collusion being possible
are actually quite low. For example, if there are 500 vol-
unteers per submission and a coalition of size 10 for a 10
person committee, the probability that 2 or more coalition
members is less than 0.015. To correct for this probability,
we can simply decrease the value of µ′ that the algorithm
uses slightly, and still end up with a quite robust algorithm.
Related work
As we said, our approach uses techniques from peer pre-
diction (Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser 2005). The reward
mechanism is very similar, but the crucial difference is that
we use scrip to pay the monitors, rather than real utility.
Our analysis of the behaviour and incentives of the token
economy draws heavily on prior work on scrip systems by
Kash et al. (2006; 2015). We adopt many of their techniques,
but extend their analysis to a variant model that applies to
our setting. Other work has shown that changing the random
volunteer procedure can improve welfare (Johnson, Simchi-
Levi, and Sun 2014) and that this approach still works if
more than one agent must be hired to perform work (Hum-
bert, Manshaei, and Hubaux 2011). Work from the systems
community has looked at practical details such as the effi-
cient implementation of a token bank (Vishnumurthy, Chan-
drakumar, and Sirer 2003).
A number of norm-enforcement mechanisms with good
incentive properties have been analysed (Kandori 1992;
Ellison 1994). De Pinnick et al. (2010) proposed a dis-
tributed norm enforcement mechanism that uses ostracism
as punishment, and showed both analytically and experi-
mentally that it provides an upper bound on the number of
norm violations.
There is a significant amount of work in the MAS liter-
ature on infrastructures for implementing normative organ-
isations and on monitoring for norm violations. One com-
mon approach involves the use of additional components
or agents to implement the normative organisation. For ex-
ample, Boella and van der Torre (2003) propose ‘defender
agents’ that detect and punish norm violations. Esteva et
al. (2004) propose the use of ‘governors’ to monitor and
regiment message exchanges between agents; each agent is
associated with a governor, and all interactions with other
agents are filtered by the governor to ensure compliance with
norms. Grizard et al. (2007) propose an approach in which
a separate system of ‘controller agents’ monitor norm viola-
tions and apply reputational sanctions to ‘application agents’
in a MAS; application agents avoid interactions with other
application agents that have low reputation, hence eventu-
ally excluding bad agents from the system. Modgil et al.
(2009) propose a two-layer approach, in which ‘trusted ob-
servers’ relay observations of states of interest referenced
by norms to ‘monitor agents’ responsible for determining
whether a norm has been violated (a similar approach is de-
scribed by Criado et al. (2012)). Hu¨bner et al. (2010) de-
scribe an approach in which ‘organizational agents’ monitor
interactions between agents mediated by ‘organizational ar-
tifacts’. Balke et al. (2013) used simulation to investigate
the effectiveness and costs of paying ‘enforcement agents’
to monitor norm violations in a wireless mobile grid sce-
nario; the mechanism they propose for rewarding enforce-
ment agents results in a cost to the MAS (in their setting, the
telecommunications company), and they assume sanction-
based enforcement (agents who violate the norm are pun-
ished by the telecommunications company). Testerink et al.
(2014) consider the problem of monitoring and enforcement
by a network of normative organisations in which each nor-
mative organisation has only partial information about the
actions of the agents and is capable of only local enforce-
ment (by sanctioning).
In general, these approaches assume that a single com-
ponent or agent can be used to reliably detect a norm vi-
olation. Moreover, the cost of monitoring is borne by the
MAS organisation, either in the cost of running additional
system components which monitor and regulate interactions
(e.g., (Boella and van der Torre 2003; Esteva et al. 2004)) or
by paying some agents (in utility) to monitor the rest (e.g.,
(Balke, De Vos, and Padget 2013)). Fagundes et al. (2014)
have explored the tradeoff between the efficiency and cost
of norm enforcement in stochastic environments, to identify
scenarios in which monitoring can be funded by sanctions
levied on violating agents while at the same time keeping the
number of violations within a tolerable level. However, in
an open multi-agent system, approaches in which norm en-
forcement is based on sanctioning (e.g., (Grizard et al. 2007;
Testerink, Dastani, and Meyer 2014)), sanctioned agents
may simply leave the system and rejoin under a different id.
Because we do not use sanctioning, this issue does not arise
under our approach. (As we pointed out, agents may want to
leave the system and rejoin if they have a significant token
deficit, but this does not really cause a problem for us.)
Conclusions
We have presented an approach to incentivising monitor-
ing for norm violations in open multi-agent systems such
as Wikipedia. In such systems, there is no crisp definition of
a norm violation, so we need to rely on potentially erroneous
evaluations of individual agents, who may legitimately dis-
agree about borderline cases. Using ideas from scrip systems
and peer prediction, we show how to design a mechanism
that incentivises agents to monitor each other’s behaviour
for norm violations. The mechanism keeps the probability of
undetected violations low, and is robust against collusion by
the monitoring agents. In contrast to prior work, in the pres-
ence of strategic decisions about whether to violate norms,
our equilibrium does not result in agents intentionally vi-
olating the norm or the system sometimes deliberately not
monitoring. The equilibrium is achieved by agents follow-
ing history-independent strategies; this shows that approxi-
mately optimal norm enforcement is possible without keep-
ing track of agents’ past behaviour. Our techniques may also
be of interest for settings other than norm enforcement that
also have the features of a lack of both money and access to
ground truth.
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